Author: telegraph

No Way To Pick A President? Here Are 6 Other Ways To Do It

Every four years, Iowans are deluged with the talking points, the stump speeches, the polls and, of course, the ads. They also hear that they shouldn’t be first. Iowans are too white, too old and too few to merit first-in-the-nation status, say the critics. But if Iowa shouldn’t be first, who should be? For more than a century, reformers have been proposing ideas for how to change the primary system. And they’ve been failing. And they’ll probably continue to fail.

No one is going to persuade state and party machinery to change the current primary system anytime soon. However, these ideas can at least help show what works (and what doesn’t) about the way things are now. Here are just a few of the ideas people have proposed over the years:

1. Pick A New State

The gist

Just what it sounds like: let someone else go before Iowa and New Hampshire.

Who has promoted it

Someone new every cycle. Time and the Washington Post’s The Fix blog (twice!) have weighed in in the past year, as has this thread of redditors. (NPR’s own Asma Khalid will have her own best-first-state analysis coming out soon.)

Pros

People generally have two big criticisms of Iowa’s first-in-the-nation status (and New Hampshire’s, as well): (1) that the states are not representative of the rest of the country, and (2) that they’re too tiny. Were a state like California or Texas or Florida or New York first, a much bigger share of the U.S. population would get a shot at shaping the presidential race early. And with any of those states (and plenty of others) you get more diversity; Iowa and New Hampshire are two of the whitest states in the country, as well as two of the most rural.

Cons

Iowa’s smallness is in some ways a feature, not a bug, in that it allows less well funded candidates a fair shot (see: Rick Santorum, 2012, and Mike Huckabee, 2008). The state’s caucus “ensures that there is at least one place where a candidate with a compelling message has a shot at winning, regardless of money or national fame,” as the Des Moines Register’s Kathy O’Bradovich argued in October.

There’s also more to being representative than race and ethnicity. A 2009 paper by the University of Iowa’s Michael Lewis-Beck and Missouri’s Peverill Squire found that Iowa was the most representative state economically at the time, as well as relatively representative (12th out of 50 states) when a broad range of social, demographic and economic factors were included.

In addition, simply picking a new state wouldn’t solve all of the problems with the current system. In 2008, the scramble to hold early caucuses and primaries led to a massively front-loaded calendar. Scrambling the states into a new order wouldn’t have stopped that struggle from happening.

2. National Primary

The gist

Let people nationwide cast their primary ballots all at once.

Who has promoted it

Rep. Richard Hobson in 1911 and a lot more people since then. Well over 100 bills and resolutions have been introduced in Congress since then to try to create a national primary.

Pros

A national primary would eliminate worries about one or two states having outsize sway by virtue of voting super early. Not only that, but it would make a complicated calendar way less complex and stop the constant shifting of dates.

And by eliminating a bunch of confusion, it might make primaries “more accessible to the average voter,” which could in turn make for “more moderate candidates who are more representative of their constituents,” as Pacific Standard’s Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz wrote in 2014.

Cons

It would make money and name recognition even more important than they already are. Instead of having to focus early on buying ads in Iowa (or whichever state might otherwise go first), a candidate would have a whole nation of media markets to try to hit. That means a less well funded candidate who currently can stand a chance in the small early states right now would be at a huge disadvantage.

It could also disadvantage a grass-roots-fueled candidate like Bernie Sanders. The Vermont independent leads or is closely matched with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the two early states of Iowa and New Hampshire this year, but he trails by double digits in most national polls.

In addition, this kind of plan could mean that candidates would focus only on the highest-population states, leaving smaller and largely rural states without many cities — and therefore fewer delegates — all but abandoned. That’s what Alabama’s then-Secretary of State Beth Chapman wrote at U.S. News in 2012.

3. Rotating Regional Primary

The gist

Don’t want to give a couple of states all the early-voting power, every single election? A rotating regional primary would break up the U.S. into a few segments and let each take a turn going first. Under perhaps the best-known rotating primary plan, put forward by the National Association of Secretaries of State in 2008, there would be four regions (East, Midwest, South and West), with each taking one primary slot (in March, April, May or June). The order of regions would then rotate in each election cycle.

Who has promoted it

RNC Chairman Reince Priebus, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National Lieutenant Governors Association and plenty of others.

Pros

A scheduled system like this would get rid of the date-wrangling that led to a superearly nominating season in 2008. This is the first reason that the secretaries of state association gave in its 2008 proposal, pointing out that 37 states voted before Feb. 29 that year, while only nine did so in 2000.

It also could give voters more time to get to know the candidates and give more informed votes, not to mention potentially giving more voters a say in who eventually gets nominated, the group argued.

Finally, it could make campaigning more efficient — no longer would candidates have to hop from Iowa to New Hampshire to South Carolina for a few months. And as the University of Arizona’s Barbara Norrander has argued, it would make campaign ads more efficient. (Consider the border-residing Minnesotans and Illinoisans currently being subjected to Iowa’s campaign ads).

Cons

Here’s one weird twist: The secretaries of state proposal still puts Iowa and New Hampshire first, “based upon their tradition of promoting retail politics.” That defeats the purpose of reforming the system to some degree, keeping those two demographically unrepresentative states at the front of the calendar.

But leaving that aside, there are other potential problems with rotating regional primaries. While the plan seeks to equalize states’ participation in primaries, whichever region goes last in any given cycle runs the risk of being meaningless; it’s possible the winners will already be apparent by the time the final contest rolls around.

Certain candidates would also probably benefit more in any given election based on which region goes first, as political scientists Steven Smith and Melanie Springer wrote in 2009. Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, for example, could potentially benefit far more if this primary season started with South, and Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders could get a big initial boost from a Northeastern primary. Not only that, but knowing that her or his region would be first in the next election, a strong candidate in one region could “block out a strong candidate from another region,” as former Ohio GOP Chairman Bob Bennett argued.

And maybe taking things a few states at a time isn’t such a bad idea, argues Norrander.

“Most would agree that face-to-face meetings between the candidates and real voters are a good component of the current system,” she writes. “Because of the large size of each region, candidate strategy will consist of television advertising and tarmac campaigning.”

4. The Delaware Plan

The gist

Let the little states go first. The Delaware Plan separates states into four groups, each with 12 or 13 states, as explained by voting-reform advocacy group FairVote. Group 1, consisting of the smallest-population states and territories, votes first, followed by Group 2 one month later, and so on.

Who has promoted it

Most notably, the RNC considered the Delaware Plan in 2000.

Pros

The point of the Delaware Plan was to keep the nomination season from growing shorter and shorter, as states fought to go earlier and earlier, as USA Today reported in 2000. That year, the season was so short that two-thirds of the states ended up “without a voice,” the paper reported.

The Delaware Plan tries to equalize states: Smaller states naturally have a smaller voice, but they’d get amplified by being earlier. Meanwhile, the powerful larger states’ voices would be turned down a bit by being later. And because a candidate couldn’t win the nomination very early, it would prolong the primary season, giving people longer to learn about the candidate and make their decisions.

In addition, it could equalize candidates to some degree — candidates with lots of grass-roots support could likewise gain ground in the small states and potentially then be able to compete in the bigger states, as FairVote argues.

Cons

Smaller states tend to be less urban than the rest of the country, not to mention whiter, as Smith and Springer wrote — meaning this plan wouldn’t exactly solve the issue of early states not being representative.

They also add that starting with 12 states that aren’t geographically grouped would create some super-inefficient campaigns, as opposed to the way that a regional plan might make campaigning easier.

In addition, starting off with so many states at once could still favor better-funded candidates, Norrander points out.

5. The Ohio Plan

The gist

This is a sort of compromise between the Delaware Plan and the rotating regional plan. The Ohio Plan would have let four current early states (Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Nevada) go first, followed by a group of 15 small states and territories.

After that, three bigger groups of states would take turns holding their primaries. Each of those groups would have had at least one high-population “anchor state,” as Brookings’ Elaine Kamarck explains.

Who has promoted it

The Ohio Plan was proposed by Bob Bennett, the then-chairman of the Ohio GOP, before the 2008 election.

Pros

Bennett argued that his plan would be more acceptable to big states than the Delaware Plan while maintaining the kind of retail politics influence that small states — and the current early states — allow. In addition, keeping South Carolina and Nevada early would add more diversity early in the process than the Delaware Plan.

Cons

The plan would still maintain some of the cons of the secretaries of states’ and Delaware plans — despite the early participation of South Carolina and Nevada, there are still a lot of very white states with early influence. In addition, candidates would have to hit a lot of geographically far-flung states at once.

6. Graduated Random Presidential Primaries (Aka ‘The California Plan,’ Aka ‘The American Plan’)

The gist

It’s a little like the Delaware Plan in the sense that smaller states would go first. However, it’s way more complicated.

So here goes: There would be 10 caucus periods, each lasting two weeks. States with fewer congressional districts would go first, followed by states with a few more in the next period and so on.

This would be according to a particular formula: States with a total of eight districts would go first, with the states being randomly selected. So, for example, Kansas and Mississippi, which each have four districts, might be in the first round. The next round, the number of districts would total 16. The next, 24.

But after that, the numbers get less straightforward. To keep the biggest states like New York and California from always going nearly last, the plan allows for some bigger district totals to go earlier. The order for all 10 caucus rounds would be eight, 16, 24, 56, 32, 64, 40, 72, 48 and then 80 districts, according to FairVote.

Who has promoted it

The Democratic National Committee considered it in 2005, and FairVote has advocated for it as well.

Pros

It maintains many of the benefits of the Delaware Plan, potentially making the primary season longer (and therefore, potentially more informative) and giving more states the opportunity to have a say — all without leaving all the biggest states for last.

Cons

Once again, there’s the potential for some really inefficient campaigning. Imagine candidates having to hop from Alaska to Idaho to West Virginia to Rhode Island for the first round of caucuses. That could give better-financed candidates a leg up.

Also, it’s complicated — but compared with what? As Smith and Springer wrote, the American Plan “surely would be no more complicated than the current schedule.”

National Health Expenditures 2015 Highlights

In 2015, U.S. health care spending increased 5.8 percent to reach $3.2 trillion, or $9,990 per person. The coverage expansion that began in 2014 as a result of in the Affordable Care Act continued to have an impact on the growth of health care spending in 2015. Additionally, faster growth in total health care spending in 2015 was driven by stronger growth in spending for private health insurance, hospital care, physician and clinical services, and the continued strong growth in Medicaid and retail prescription drug spending. Lastly, the overall share of the U.S. economy devoted to health care spending was 17.8 percent in 2015, up from 17.4 percent in 2014.

Health Spending by Type of Service or Product:

Hospital Care (32 percent share): Spending for hospital care increased 5.6 percent to $1.0 trillion in 2015 compared to 4.6 percent growth in 2014. The faster growth in 2015 was driven by continued growth in non-price factors such as the use and intensity of services. However, hospital price growth was just 0.9 percent in 2015, which was the lowest rate of growth since 1998. Hospital services, from a payer perspective, experienced faster growth in Medicaid and private health insurance spending; however this strong growth was slightly offset by slower growth in Medicare hospital spending.

Physician and Clinical Services (20 percent share): Spending on physician and clinical services increased 6.3 percent in 2015 to $634.9 billion. This was an acceleration from growth of 4.8 percent in 2014 and was the first time since 2005 that the growth rate exceeded 6.0 percent. As with hospitals, the faster growth in overall physician and clinical services spending was driven by continued growth in non-price factors. Price growth for physician and clinical services, however, declined 1.1 percent in 2015, driven by the expiration of temporary increases in Medicaid payments to primary care physicians.

Other Professional Services (3 percent share): Spending for other professional services reached $87.7 billion in 2015, an increase of 5.9 percent and an acceleration from growth of 5.1 percent in 2014. Spending in this category includes establishments of independent health practitioners (except physicians and dentists) that primarily provide services such as physical therapy, optometry, podiatry, or chiropractic medicine.

Dental Services (4 percent share): Spending for dental services increased 4.2 percent in 2015 to $117.5 billion, which was an acceleration from 2.4 percent growth in 2014. Out-of-pocket spending for dental services (which accounted for 40 percent of dental spending) increased 1.8 percent in 2015 after increasing 0.8 percent in 2014. Private health insurance (which accounted for 47 percent of dental spending) increased 3.0 percent in 2015 following 2.1 percent growth in 2014.

Other Health, Residential, and Personal Care Services (5 percent share): Spending associated with other health, residential, and personal care services grew 7.8 percent in 2015 to $163.3 billion after increasing 5.0 percent in 2014. The robust growth was driven by 10.0 percent growth in Medicaid spending, which represented nearly 57 percent of all spending in this category. This category includes expenditures for medical services that are generally delivered by providers in non-traditional settings such as schools, community centers, and the workplace; as well as by ambulance providers and residential mental health and substance abuse facilities.

Home Health Care (3 percent share): Spending growth for freestanding home health care agencies accelerated in 2015, increasing 6.3 percent to $88.8 billion following growth of 4.5 percent in 2014. Stronger growth in both Medicare (2.6 percent) and Medicaid (6.0 percent) spending — the two largest payers which accounted for 76 percent of home health spending — along with faster growth in private health insurance and out-of-pocket spending drove the overall acceleration in 2015.

Nursing Care Facilities and Continuing Care Retirement Communities (5 percent share): Spending for freestanding nursing care facilities and continuing care retirement communities increased 2.7 percent in 2015 to $156.8 billion. The slightly faster growth in 2015 (from 2.3 percent growth in 2014) was mainly due to the faster growth in Medicare spending of 5.6 percent versus 2.5 percent in 2014.

Prescription Drugs (10 percent share): Retail prescription drug spending decelerated in 2015, increasing 9.0 percent to $324.6 billion. Although growth in 2015 was slower than the 12.4 percent growth in 2014, spending on prescription drugs outpaced all other services in 2015. The strong spending growth for prescription drugs is attributed to the increased spending on new medicines, price growth for existing brand name drugs, increased spending on generics, and fewer expensive blockbuster drugs going off-patent.

Durable Medical Equipment (2 percent share): Retail spending for durable medical equipment, which includes items such as contact lenses, eyeglasses and hearing aids, reached $48.5 billion in 2015, and increased 3.9 percent, slightly faster than the 3.5 percent growth in 2014.

Other Non-durable Medical Products (2 percent share): Retail spending for other nondurable medical products, such as over-the-counter medicines, medical instruments, and surgical dressings, grew 3.7 percent to $59.0 billion in 2015.

Health Spending by Major Sources of Funds:

Medicare (20 percent share): Medicare spending grew 4.5 percent to $646.2 billion in 2015, which was a slight deceleration from the 4.8 growth percent in 2014. The slightly slower growth in 2015 was largely attributable to slower growth in Medicare enrollment, which increased 2.7 percent to 54.3 million beneficiaries following 3.1 percent growth in 2014.

Medicaid (17 percent share): Total Medicaid spending slowed slightly in 2015 to 9.7 percent, but continued the strong growth that began in 2014 (11.6 percent) State and local Medicaid expenditures grew 4.9 percent while Federal Medicaid expenditures increased 12.6 percent in 2015. The increased spending by the federal government was largely driven by newly eligible enrollees under the ACA, which were fully financed by the federal government.

Private Health Insurance (33 percent share): Total private health insurance expenditures increased 7.2 percent to $1.1 trillion in 2015, faster than the 5.8 percent growth in 2014. The acceleration in 2015 was driven by increased enrollment and strong growth in benefit spending.

Out-of-Pocket (11 percent share): Out-of-pocket spending grew 2.6 percent in 2015 to $338.1 billion, slightly faster than the growth of 1.4 percent in 2014. The increase in 2015 was influenced by the expansion of insurance coverage and the corresponding drop in the number of individuals without health insurance.

Health Spending by Type of Sponsor:

In 2015, the federal government accounted for the largest share of health care spending (29 percent), followed by households (28 percent), private businesses (20 percent), and state and local governments (17 percent).

Federal government spending on health increased 8.9 percent in 2015 after growing 11.0 percent in 2014, and outpaced all other sponsors of health care in both years. In 2015, the federal government was the largest sponsor of health care at 29 percent, up from 28 percent in 2014 and 26 percent in 2013. The main driver for the increased federal share of health care was the continued enrollment of newly eligible adults into Medicaid, who were fully financed by the federal government.

Health spending by households grew at a rate of 4.7 percent, which was an acceleration from 2.6 percent in 2014. Household spending accounted for 28 percent of health care spending in 2015, unchanged from the year before. The faster growth in spending by households was driven largely by households’ contributions to employer-sponsored private insurance premiums.

State and local government spending increased 4.6 percent in 2015 compared to 3.2 percent growth in 2014. The acceleration was largely driven by faster growth in state and local Medicaid spending which resulted from increased reimbursement rates and an increased effort to expand care in the home and community setting. Overall, state and local government health care spending represented 17 percent of total health care spending in both 2014 and 2015.

Health care spending financed by private businesses accelerated slightly, increasing 5.3 percent in 2015 compared to 4.7 percent growth in 2014. The private business share of overall health spending has remained fairly steady since 2010, at about 20 percent.

Note: Type of sponsor is defined as the entity that is ultimately responsible for financing the health care bill, such as private businesses, households, and governments. These sponsors pay health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket costs, or finance health care through dedicated taxes and/or general revenues.

The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A Brief, Simple History

In this video, Vox outlines the key points of the Israel Palestine conflict. It begins with the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the rise of Palestinian nationalism and Zionism – the belief that Judaism is a nationality and that Jewish people deserve a nation of their own. 

This history of the conflict then looks at the migration of Jewish people during and after WWII, the tension in the area, international support for a state of Israel and the UN proposal in 1947 to divide the area into two states with Jerusalem as an international zone. It tracks the conflict through: the Arab-Israeli war 1948-1949, the 1967 Six Days War; the Camp David Accords in 1978 that resulted in Israel giving Sinai back to Egypt; the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization; Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, the first and second Intifada; the Oslo Accords, and the assassination the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin.

The video ends with the description that much of the history of the conflict “shows how extremists on both sides can use violence to derail peace and keep a permanent conflict going.” Vox is uncertain about where the situation will lead but they do not see an end in sight.

 

National Health Expenditures Fact Sheet

NHE grew 5.8% to $3.2 trillion in 2015, or $9,990 per person, and accounted for 17.8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Medicare spending grew 4.5% to $646.2 billion in 2015, or 20 percent of total NHE.

Medicaid spending grew 9.7% to $545.1 billion in 2015, or 17 percent of total NHE.

Private health insurance spending grew 7.2% to $1,072.1 billion in 2015, or 33 percent of total NHE.

Out of pocket spending grew 2.6% to $338.1 billion in 2015, or 11 percent of total NHE.

Hospital expenditures grew 5.6% to $1,036.1 billion in 2015, faster than the 4.6% growth in 2014.

Physician and clinical services expenditures grew 6.3% to $634.9 billion in 2015, a faster growth than the 4.8% in 2014.

Prescription drug spending increased 9.0% to $324.6 billion in 2015, slower than the 12.4% growth in 2014.

The largest shares of total health spending were sponsored by the federal government (28.7 percent) and the households (27.7 percent).   The private business share of health spending accounted for 19.9 percent of total health care spending, state and local governments accounted for 17.1 percent, and other private revenues accounted for 6.7 percent.

Projected NHE, 2016-2025:

National health spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.6 percent per year for 2016-25, and 4.7 percent per year on a per capita basis.

Health spending is projected to grow 1.2 percentage points faster than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per year over the 2016-25 period; as a result, the health share of GDP is expected to rise from 17.8 percent in 2015 to 19.9 percent by 2025.

Throughout the 2016-25 projection period, growth in national health expenditures is driven by projected faster growth in medical prices (from historically low growth in 2015 of 0.8 percent to nearly 3 percent by 2025). This faster expected growth in prices is partially offset by projected slowing growth in the use and intensity of medical goods and services.

Although the largest health insurance coverage impacts from the Affordable Care Act’s expansions have already been observed in 2014-15, the insured share of the population is projected to increase from 90.9 percent in 2015 to 91.5 percent in 2025.Health spending growth by federal and state & local governments is projected to outpace growth by private businesses, households, and other private payers over the projection period (5.9 percent compared to 5.4 percent, respectively) in part due to ongoing strong enrollment growth in Medicare by the baby boomer generation coupled with continued government funding dedicated to subsidizing premiums for lower income Marketplace enrollees.

This expectation is mainly a result of continued anticipated growth in private health insurance enrollment, in particular for employer-sponsored insurance, during the first half of the decade in response to faster projected economic growth.

National health spending growth is projected to have decelerated from 5.8 percent in 2015 to 4.8 percent in 2016 as the initial impacts associated with the Affordable Care Act’s major coverage expansions fade. Medicaid spending growth is projected to have decelerated sharply from 9.7 percent in 2015 to 3.7 percent in 2016 as enrollment growth in the program slowed significantly. Similarly, private health insurance spending growth is projected to have slowed from 7.2 percent in 2015 to 5.9 percent in 2016 (also largely attributable to slowing expected growth in enrollment).

Health spending is projected to grow 5.4 percent in 2017 related to faster growth in Medicare and private health insurance spending.

Health expenditures are projected to grow at an average rate of 5.9 percent for 2018-19, the fastest of the sub-periods examined, as projected spending growth in Medicare and Medicaid accelerates.

Through the second half of the projection (2020-25), increasing medical prices are offset by projected decelerations in growth in the use and intensity of medical goods and services, leading to average growth of 5.8 percent per year for national health expenditures.

NHE by Age Group and Gender, Selected Years 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012:

Per person personal health care spending for the 65 and older population was $18,988 in 2012, over 5 times higher than spending per child ($3,552) and approximately 3 times the spending per working-age person ($6,632).

In 2012, children accounted for approximately 25 percent of the population and slightly less than 12 percent of all PHC spending.

The working-age group comprised the majority of spending and population in 2012, almost 54 percent and over 61 percent respectively.

The elderly were the smallest population group, nearly 14 percent of the population, and accounted for approximately 34 percent of all spending in 2012.

Per person spending for females ($8,315) was 22 percent more than males ($6,788) in 2012.

In 2012, per person spending for male children (0-18) was 9 percent more than females.  However, for the working age and elderly groups, per person spending for females was 28 and 7 percent more than for males.

NHE by State of Residence, 1991-2014:

In 2014, per capita personal health care spending ranged from $5,982 in Utah to $11,064 in Alaska.   Per capita spending in Alaska was 38 percent higher than the national average ($8,045) while spending in Utah was about 26 percent lower; they have been the lowest and highest, respectively, since 2012.

Health care spending by region continued to exhibit considerable variation. In 2014, the New England and Mideast regions had the highest levels of total per capita personal health care spending ($10,119 and $9,370, respectively), or 26 and 16 percent higher than the national average.   In contrast, the Rocky Mountain and Southwest regions had the lowest levels of total personal health care spending per capita ($6,814 and $6,978, respectively) with average spending roughly 15 percent lower than the national average.

For 2010-14, average growth in per capita personal health care spending was highest in Alaska at 4.8 percent per year and lowest in Arizona at 1.9 percent per year (compared with average growth of 3.1 percent nationally).

The spread between the highest and the lowest per capita personal health spending across the states has remained relatively stable over 2009-14. Accordingly, the highest per capita spending levels were 80 to 90 percent higher per year than the lowest per capita spending levels during the period.

Medicare expenditures per beneficiary were highest in New Jersey ($12,614) and lowest in Montana ($8,238) in 2014.

Medicaid expenditures per enrollee were highest in North Dakota ($12,413) and lowest in Illinois ($4,959) in 2014.

NHE by State of Provider, 1980-2014:

Between 2009 and 2014, U.S. personal health care spending grew, on average, 3.9 percent per year, with spending in North Dakota growing the fastest (6.7 percent) and spending in Rhode Island growing the slowest (2.5 percent).

In 2014, California’s personal health care spending was highest in the nation ($295.0 billion), representing 11.5 percent of total U.S. personal health care spending. Comparing historical state rankings through 2014, California consistently had the highest level of total personal health care spending, together with the highest total population in the nation. Other large states, New York, Texas, Florida, and Pennsylvania, also were among the states with the highest total personal health care spending.

Wyoming’s personal health care spending was lowest in the nation (as has been the case historically), representing just 0.2 percent of total U.S. personal health care spending in 2014. Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota, and South Dakota were also among the states with the lowest personal health care spending in both 2014 and historically. All these states have smaller populations.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by state measures the value of goods and services produced in each state. Health spending as a share of a state’s GDP shows the importance of the health care sector in a state’s economy. As a share of GDP, Maine ranked the highest (22.3 percent) and Wyoming ranked the lowest (9.3 percent) in 2014.

Lecture On Why We Worry About Inequality

Robert Reich discusses the current state of the United States economic system and possibilities for change. He shares his ideas concerning income distribution and the struggling middle class and explores what effects the increasing income gap has not only on the U.S. economy but American democracy itself.

 

Lecture On Saving Capitalism

UC Berkeley economist Robert Reich reveals how power and influence have created a new American oligarchy, a shrinking middle class, and the greatest income inequality and wealth disparity in 80 years. Citing his latest book, “Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few,” Goldman School of Public Policy Professor Reich lays out what he argues must be done to restore democracy and rebuild the US economy. 

 

The Angry Birds Approach To Understanding Deficits In The Modern Economy

Dr. Kelton clears up the misinformation on Fed Deficits being told Americans. Stephanie consults with policymakers, investment banks and portfolio managers across the globe. Her research expertise is in: Federal Reserve operations, fiscal policy, social security, health care, international finance and employment policy. 

 

Wait Time At VA Exposed Failures

The effect and cost of war on our troops is undeniable. It takes a toll on the toughest among them. Coming home should offer peace and a chance to heal.

But the reality is that our veterans often come home indelibly changed, marked with the scars of war. They deal with wounds that are both visible and invisible. I’ve seen firsthand the true cost of war, and through our veterans, we see how that cost continues long after they come home.

Forty years ago, 75 percent of Congress had served our country in uniform. Today, that number has dropped to just 18 percent. Sadly, it shows. One of the main reasons I ran for Congress was to bring voice to my brothers and sisters in uniform, to stop our country’s leaders from sending them into harm’s way to fight unnecessary wars of choice, and to honor their service by caring for them when they come home.

Last year, our country’s failure to fulfill its promise to our veterans was starkly exposed. At the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), veterans faced wait times of 90 days or more to see a doctor. Hawaii veterans experienced the worst wait times in the country, averaging 145 days — almost five months — for a simple primary care visit. Unfortunately, these inexcusable wait times have only scratched the surface of the systemic problems that still exist within the VA and the obstacles that stand in the way of our veterans getting the care they need.

Of all the calls and requests for assistance my office gets, veterans who need help make up the vast majority. Far too many veterans in our state are still being dishonored — a Kauai veteran whose documents have been repeatedly misplaced by the VA and VBA (Veterans Benefits Administration); a disabled medic with post-traumatic stress disorder on Maui whose request for an evaluation so he can obtain a service dog is stuck in a bureaucratic appeals case; or a veteran on Hawaii island with cancer whose benefits were just reduced.

As VA crises unfolded last year, I introduced a bill called the Access to Care and Treatment (ACT) Now for Veterans Act. The bill’s premise, to allow veterans to get the immediate care they need from non-VA medical providers, was ultimately included in the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act that was enacted last year.

While far from perfect, this legislation has provided some immediate relief to our veterans who’ve been waiting so long for care.

The VA must begin to rebuild veterans’ trust by holding leaders accountable for their malpractice and focusing on its mission of serving veterans.

If our country invested as much time, resources and capital into serving our veterans as it does into nation-building in other countries, spending $43 million on building a gas station in Afghanistan, or pursuing failed missions, such as the $500 million effort to train and equip so-called moderate Syrian rebels, we could be on the road toward making sure that our nation’s sons and daughters receive the care and services they were promised, have earned, and deserve.

After serving and sacrificing for all of us, every single veteran should come home knowing that we are there for them, and we have their back.

Impeachment And Removal

The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other “civil Officers of the United States” found to have engaged in “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual in the hands of the House of Representatives.

Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which the impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. Should a conviction occur, the Senate retains limited authority to determine the appropriate punishment. Under the Constitution, the penalty for conviction on an impeachable offense is limited to either removal from office, or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of “honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Although removal from office would appear to flow automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Approval of such a measure requires only the support of a simple majority.

Key Takeaways of This Report

The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

  • A simple majority of the House is necessary to approve articles of impeachment.
  • If the Senate, by vote of a two-thirds majority, convicts the official on any article of impeachment, the result is removal from office and, at the Senate’s discretion, disqualification from holding future office.
  • The Constitution does not articulate who qualifies as a “civil officer.” Most impeachments have applied to federal judges. With regard to the executive branch, lesser functionaries—such as federal employees who belong to the civil service, do not exercise “significant authority,” and are not appointed by the President or an agency head—do not appear to be subject to impeachment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it would appear that any official who qualifies as a principal officer, including a head of an agency such as a Secretary, Administrator, or Commissioner, is likely subject to impeachment.
  • Impeachable conduct does not appear to be limited to criminal behavior. Congress has identified three general types of conduct that constitute grounds for impeachment, although these categories should not be understood as exhaustive: (1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; (2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and (3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain.
  • The House has impeached 19 individuals: 15 federal judges, one Senator, one Cabinet member, and two Presidents. The Senate has conducted 16 full impeachment trials. Of these, eight individuals—all federal judges—were convicted by the Senate.

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Impeachment is one of the various checks and balances created by the Constitution, and is a crucial tool for potentially holding government officers accountable for violations of the law and abuse of power. Rooted in various constitutional provisions, impeachment is largely immune from judicial review. When considering impeachment matters, Members of Congress have historically examined the language of the Constitution; past precedents; the debates at the Constitutional Convention; the debates at the ratifying conventions; English common law and practice; state impeachment practices; analogous case law; and historical commentaries.

Although the term “impeachment” is commonly used to refer to the removal of a government official from office, the impeachment process, as described in the Constitution, entails two distinct proceedings carried out by the separate houses of Congress. First, a simple majority of the House impeaches—or formally approves allegations of wrongdoing amounting to an impeachable offense, known as articles of impeachment. The articles of impeachment are then forwarded to the Senate where the second proceeding takes place: an impeachment trial. If the Senate, by vote of a two-thirds majority, convicts the official of the alleged offenses, the result is removal from office of those still in office, and, at the Senate’s discretion, disqualification from holding future office.

The House has impeached 19 individuals: 15 federal judges, one Senator, one Cabinet member, and two Presidents. The Senate has conducted 16 full impeachment trials. Of these, eight individuals—all federal judges—were convicted by the Senate.

This report briefly surveys the constitutional provisions governing the impeachment power, examines which individuals are subject to impeachment, and explores the potential grounds for impeachment. In addition, it provides a short overview of impeachment procedures in the House and Senate and concludes with a discussion of the limited nature of judicial review for impeachment procedures.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

—Article I, Section 2

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

—Article II, Section 4

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

—Article I, Section 3

The Constitution provides that impeachment applies only to the “President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States,” and that the grounds for impeachment are limited to “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” The decision to impeach an individual rests solely with the House of Representatives. The House thus has discretion over whether to impeach an individual and what articles of impeachment will be presented to the Senate. The Senate, in turn, has the sole power to try impeachments. Conviction of an individual requires a two-thirds majority of the present Senators on one of the articles brought by the House. When conducting the trial, Senators must be “on oath or affirmation,” and the right to a jury trial does not extend to impeachment proceedings. As President of the United States Senate, the Vice President usually presides at impeachment trials; however, if the President is impeached and tried in the Senate, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides at the trial.

The immediate effect of conviction upon an article of impeachment is removal from office, although the Senate may subsequently vote on whether the official shall be disqualified from again holding an office of public trust under the United States. If this option is pursued, a simple majority vote is required. Convicted individuals are still subject to criminal prosecutions for the same factual situations, and individuals who have already been convicted of crimes may be impeached for the same underlying behavior later. Finally, the Constitution bars the President from using the pardon power to shield individuals from impeachment or removal from office.

In considering the use of the impeachment power, Congress confronts at least two preliminary legal questions bearing on whether an impeachment inquiry against a given official is constitutionally appropriate: first, whether the individual whose conduct is under scrutiny holds an office that is subject to impeachment and removal, and second, whether the conduct for which the official is accused constitutes an impeachable offense.

Who May Be Impeached and Removed?

The Constitution explicitly makes “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States” subject to impeachment and removal.  Which officials are to be considered “civil Officers of the United States” for purposes of impeachment is a significant constitutional question that remains mostly unresolved. In the past, Congress has seemingly shown a willingness to impeach Presidents, federal judges, and Cabinet-level executive branch officials, but a reluctance to impeach private individuals and Members of Congress. A question which precedent has not thus far addressed is whether Congress may impeach and remove subordinate, non-Cabinet level executive branch officials.

The Constitution does not define “civil Officers of the United States.” Nor do the debates at the Constitutional Convention provide significant evidence of which individuals (beyond the President and Vice President) the Founders intended to be impeachable. Impeachment precedents in both the House and Senate are equally unhelpful with respect to subordinate executive officials. In all of American history, only three members of the executive branch have been impeached: two Presidents and a Secretary of War. Thus, while it seems that executive officials of the highest levels are “civil Officers,” historical precedent provides no examples of the impeachment power being used against lower-level executive officials. One must, therefore, look to other sources for aid in determining precisely how far down the federal bureaucracy the impeachment power might reach.

The general purposes of impeachment may assist in interpreting the proper scope of “civil Officers of the United States.” The congressional power of impeachment constitutes an important aspect of the various checks and balances that were built into the Constitution to preserve the separation of powers. It is a tool, entrusted to the House and Senate alone, to remove government officials in the other branches of government, who either abuse their power or engage in conduct that warrants their dismissal from an office of public trust. At least one commentator has suggested that the Framers recognized, particularly with respect to executive branch officials, that there would be instances in which it may not be in the President’s interest to remove a “favorite” from office, even when that individual has violated the public trust. As such, the Framers “dwelt repeatedly on the need of power to oust corrupt or oppressive ministers whom the President might seek to shelter.” If the impeachment power were meant to ensure that Congress has the ability to impeach and remove corrupt officials that the President was unwilling to dismiss, it would seem arguable that the power should extend to officers exercising a degree of authority, the abuse of which would be harmful to the separation of powers and good government.

The writings of early constitutional commentators also arguably suggest a broad interpretation of “civil Officers of the United States.” Joseph Story addressed the reach of the impeachment power in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution, asserting that “all officers of the United states [] who hold their appointments under the national government, whether their duties are executive or judicial, in the highest or in the lowest departments of the government, with the exception of officers in the army and navy, are properly civil officers within the meaning of the constitution, and liable to impeachment.” Similarly, William Rawle reasoned that “civil Officers” included “[a]ll executive and judicial officers, from the President downwards, from the judges of the Supreme Court to those of the most inferior tribunals …” Consistent with the text of the Constitution, these early interpretations suggest the impeachment power was arguably intended to extend to “all” executive officers, and not just Cabinet level officials and other executive officials at the highest levels.

But who is an officer? The most thorough elucidation of the definition of “Officers of the United States” can be found in judicial interpretations of the Appointments Clause. That provision, which establishes the methods by which “Officers of the United States” may be appointed, has generally been viewed as a useful guidepost in establishing the definition of “civil Officers” for purposes of impeachment.

The Appointments Clause provides that the President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

In interpreting the Appointments Clause, the Court has made clear distinctions between “Officers of the United States,” whose appointment is subject to the requirements of the Clause, and nonofficers, also known as employees, whose appointment is not. The amount of authority that an individual exercises will generally determine his classification as either an officer or employee. As established in Buckley v. Valeo, an officer is “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” whereas employees are viewed as “lesser functionaries subordinate to the officers of the United States,” who do not exercise “significant authority.”

The Supreme Court has further subdivided “officers” into two categories: principal officers, whom may be appointed only by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and inferior officers, whose appointment Congress may vest “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”

The Court has acknowledged that its “cases have not set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes.” The clearest statement of the proper standard to be applied in differentiating between the two types of officers appears to have been made in Edmond v. United States. In Edmond, the Court noted that “[g]enerally speaking, the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President … [and] whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 36 Thus, in analyzing whether one may be properly characterized as either an inferior or principal officer, the Court’s decisions appear to focus on the extent of the officer’s discretion to make autonomous policy choices and the authority of other officials to supervise and to remove the officer.

Applying the principles established in the Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence to define the scope of “civil Officers” for purposes of impeachment, it would appear that employees, as non-officers, are not subject to impeachment. Therefore lesser functionaries—such as federal employees who belong to the civil service, do not exercise “significant authority,” and are not appointed by the President or an agency head—would not be subject to impeachment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it would seem that any official who qualifies as a principal officer, including a head of an agency such as a Secretary, Administrator, or Commissioner, would be impeachable.

The remaining question is whether inferior officers, or those officers who exercise significant authority under the supervision of a principal officer, are subject to impeachment and removal. As previously noted, it would appear that an argument can be made from the text and purpose of the impeachment clauses, as well as early constitutional interpretations, that the impeachment power was intended to extend to “all” officers of the United States, and not just those in the highest levels of government. Any official exercising “significant authority” including both principal and inferior officers, would therefore qualify as a “civil Officer” subject to impeachment. This view would permit Congress to impeach and remove any executive branch “officer,” including many deputy political appointees and certain administrative judges.

There is some historical evidence, however, to suggest that inferior officers were not meant to be subject to impeachment. For example, a delegate at the North Carolina ratifying convention asserted that “[i]t appears to me … the most horrid ignorance to suppose that every officer, however trifling his office, is to be impeached for every petty offense … I hope every gentleman … must see plainly that impeachments cannot extend to inferior officers of the United States.” Additionally, Governeur Morris, member of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Constitutional Convention, arguably implied that inferior officers would not be subject to impeachment in stating that “certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs, etc. … will be amenable by impeachment to the public justice.”

Notwithstanding this ongoing debate, the authority to resolve any ambiguity in the scope of “civil Officers” for purposes of impeachment lays initially with the House, in adopting articles of impeachment, and with the Senate, in trying the officer.

IMPEACHMENT GROUNDS

Is Impeachment Limited to Criminal Acts?

The Constitution describes the grounds of impeachment as “treason, bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” While treason and bribery are relatively well-defined terms, the meaning of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” is not defined in the Constitution or in statute and remains somewhat opaque. It was adopted from the English practice of parliamentary impeachments, which appears to have been directed against individuals accused of crimes against the state and encompassed offenses beyond traditional criminal law.

Some have argued that only criminal acts are impeachable offenses under the United States Constitution; impeachment is therefore inappropriate for non-criminal activity. In support of this assertion, one might note that the debate on impeachable offenses during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 indicates that criminal conduct was encompassed in the “high crimes and misdemeanors” standard.

The notion that only criminal conduct can constitute sufficient grounds for impeachment does not, however, comport with historical practice. Alexander Hamilton, in justifying placement of the power to try impeachments in the Senate, described impeachable offenses as arising from “the misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust.”

Such offenses were “political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.” According to this reasoning, impeachable conduct could include behavior that violates an official’s duty to the country, even if such conduct is not necessarily a prosecutable offense. Indeed, in the past both houses of Congress have given the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” a broad reading, “finding that impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct.”

A variety of congressional materials support this reading. For example, committee reports on potential grounds for impeachment have described the history of English impeachment as including non-criminal conduct and noted that this tradition was adopted by the Framers. In accordance with the understanding of “high” offenses in the English tradition, impeachable offenses are “constitutional wrongs that subvert the structure of government, or undermine the integrity of office and even the Constitution itself.” “[O]ther high crimes and misdemeanor[s]” are not limited to indictable offenses, but apply to “serious violations of the public trust.” Congressional materials indicate that the term “Misdemeanor … does not mean a minor criminal offense as the term is generally employed in the criminal law,” but refers instead to the behavior of public officials. “[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors” are thus best characterized as “misconduct that damages the state and the operations of government institutions.”

Similarly, the judiciary subcommittee charged with investigating Associate Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court concluded that, at least with regard to federal judges, impeachment was appropriate in several circumstances. First, if the conduct was connected with the judicial office or the exercise of judicial power, then both criminal conduct and conduct constituting a serious dereliction of public duty were grounds for impeachment. Second, if the conduct was not connected to the duties of judicial office, then criminal conduct could constitute grounds for impeachment. The committee left unresolved whether non-criminal conduct outside of the judicial function could support an impeachment charge.

The purposes underlying the impeachment process also indicate that non-criminal activity may constitute sufficient grounds for impeachment. The purpose of impeachment is not to inflict personal punishment for criminal activity. In fact, the Constitution explicitly makes clear that impeached individuals are not immunized from criminal liability once they are impeached for particular activity. Instead, impeachment is a “remedial” tool; it serves to effectively “maintain constitutional government” by removing individuals unfit for office. Grounds for impeachment include abuse of the particular powers of government office or a violation of the “public trust”—conduct that is unlikely to be barred via statute.

Congressional practice also appears to support this notion. Many of the impeachments approved by the House of Representatives have included conduct that did not involve criminal activity. Less than a third have specifically invoked a criminal statute or used the term “crime.” For example, in 1803, Judge John Pickering was impeached and convicted for, among other things, appearing on the bench “in a state of total intoxication.” In 1912, Judge Robert W. Archbald was impeached and convicted for abusing his position as a judge by inducing parties before him to enter financial transactions with him. In 1936, Judge Halstead Ritter was impeached and convicted for conduct that “br[ought] his court into disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the administration of justice … and to the prejudice of public respect for and confidence in the federal judiciary.” And a number of judges were impeached for misusing their position for personal profit.

Are the Standards for Impeachable Offenses the Same for Judges and Executive Branch Officials?

Some have suggested that the standard for impeaching a federal judge differs from an executive branch official. While Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution specifies the grounds for the impeachment of civil officers as “treason, bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” Article III, Section 1, provides that federal judges “hold their Offices during good behaviour.” One argument posits that these clauses should be read in conjunction, meaning that judges can be impeached and removed from office if they fail to exhibit good behavior or if they are guilty of “treason, bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

However, while one might find some support for the notion that the “good behavior” clause constitutes an additional ground for impeachment in early twentieth century practice, the “modern view” of Congress appears to be that the phrase “good behavior” simply designates judicial tenure, Under this reasoning, rather than functioning as a ground for impeachment, the “good behavior” phrase simply makes clear that federal judges retain their office for life unless they are removed via a proper constitutional mechanism. For example, a 1973 discussion of impeachment grounds released by the House Judiciary Committee reviewed the history of the phrase and concluded that the “Constitutional Convention … quite clearly rejected” a “dual standard” for judges and civil officers. The “treason, bribery, and high Crimes and Misdemeanors” clause thus serves as the sole standard for impeachable conduct for both executive branch officials and federal judges. The next year, the House Judiciary Committee’s Impeachment Inquiry asked whether the “good behavior” clause provides an additional ground for impeachment of judges and concluded that “[i]t does not.” It emphasized that the House’s impeachment of judges was “consistent” with impeachment of “non-judicial officers.” Finally, the House Report on the Impeachment of President Clinton affirmed this reading of the Constitution, stating that impeachable conduct for judges mirrored impeachable conduct for other civil officers in the government.

Nevertheless, even if the “good behavior” clause does not delineate a standard for impeachment and removal for federal judges, as a practical matter, one might argue that the range of impeachable conduct differs between judges and executive branch officials due to the differing nature of each office. For example, one might argue that a federal judge could be impeached for perjury or fraud because of the importance of trustworthiness and impartiality to the judiciary, while the same behavior might not constitute impeachable conduct for an executive branch official. However, given the wide variety of factors at issue—including political calculations, the relative paucity of impeachments of non-judicial officers compared to judges, and the fact that a non-judicial officer has never been convicted by the Senate—it is uncertain if conduct meriting impeachment and conviction for a judge would fail to qualify for a non-judicial officer.

The impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton illustrates this difficulty. The House of Representatives impeached President Clinton for (1) providing perjurious and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury and (2) obstruction of justice in regards to a civil rights action against him. The House Judiciary Committee report that recommended articles of impeachment argued that perjury by the President was an impeachable offense, even if committed with regard to matters outside his official duties. The report rejected the notion that conduct such as perjury was “more detrimental when committed by judges and therefore only impeachable when committed by judges.” The report pointed to the impeachment of Judge Claiborne, who was impeached and convicted for falsifying his income tax returns—an act which “betrayed the trust of the people of the United States and reduced confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” While it is “devastating” for the judiciary when judges are perceived as dishonest, the report argued, perjury by the President was “just as devastating to our system of government.” In addition, the report continued, both Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon were impeached and convicted for perjury and false statements in matters distinct from their official duties. Likewise, the report noted the President’s perjurious conduct, though seemingly falling outside of his official duties as President, nonetheless constituted grounds for impeachment.

In contrast, the minority views from the report opposing impeachment reasoned that “not all impeachable offenses are crimes and not all crimes are impeachable offenses.” The minority emphasized that the President was not impeachable for all potential crimes, no matter how minor; impeachment was reserved for “conduct that constitutes an egregious abuse or subversion of the powers of the executive office.” Examining the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and the articles of impeachment drawn up for President Richard Nixon, the minority concluded that both were accused of committing “public misconduct” integral to their “official duties.” The minority noted that the Judiciary Committee had rejected an article of impeachment against President Nixon alleging that he committed tax fraud, primarily because that “related to the President’s private conduct, not to an abuse of his authority as President.”

The minority did not explicitly claim that the grounds for impeachment might be different between federal judges and executive branch officials, but its reasoning at least hints in that direction. Its rejection of nonpublic behavior as sufficient grounds for impeachment for the President—including its example of tax fraud as nonpublic behavior that does not qualify— appears to conflict with the past impeachment and conviction of federal judges on just this basis. One reading of the minority’s position is that certain behavior might be impeachable conduct for a federal judge, but not for the President.

While two articles of impeachment were approved by the House, the Senate acquitted President Clinton on both charges. However, generating firm conclusions from this result is quite difficult as there may have been varying motivations for these votes. One possibility is that the acquittal occurred because some Senators—though agreeing that such conduct merited impeachment— thought the House Managers failed to prove their case. Another is that certain Senators disagreed that such behavior was impeachable at all. Yet another possibility is that neither ideological stance was considered, and voting was conducted solely according to political calculations.

Categories of Impeachment Grounds

Congressional materials have cautioned that the grounds for impeachment “do not all fit neatly and logically into categories” because the remedy of impeachment is intended to “reach a broad variety of conduct by officers that is both serious and incompatible with the duties of the office.” Nonetheless, congressional precedents reflect three broad types of conduct thought to constitute grounds for impeachment, although they should not be understood as exhaustive or binding: (1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; (2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and (3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain.

Exceeding or Abusing the Powers of the Office

The House has impeached several individuals for abusing or exceeding the powers of their office. For example, in 1868, amidst a struggle over Reconstruction policy, the House impeached President Andrew Johnson on allegations that he violated the Tenure of Office Act, which restricted the power of the President to remove members of the Cabinet without Senate approval. Considering the statute unconstitutional, President Johnson removed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and was impeached shortly thereafter on nine articles relating to his actions. Two more articles were brought the next day, alleging that he had made “harangues” criticizing the Congress and questioning its legislative authority that brought the presidency “into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace” and attempted to prevent the execution of the Tenure in Office Act and an army appropriations act by conspiring to remove Stanton. President Johnson was acquitted by a margin of one vote in the Senate.

In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee recommended articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon on the theory that he abused the powers of his office. First, the articles alleged that the President, “using the powers of his high office,” attempted to obstruct the investigation of the Watergate Hotel break-in, conceal and protect the perpetrators, and conceal the existence of other illegal activity. Second, that he used the power of the office of the Presidency to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, “impair[]” lawful investigations, and “contravene[]” laws applicable to executive branch agencies. Third, that he refused to cooperate with congressional subpoenas.98 President Nixon resigned before the House voted on the articles.

One of the articles of impeachment recommended by the House Judiciary Committee against President Clinton also alleged abuse of the powers of his office, although the House rejected this article. That article alleged that the President refused to comply with certain congressional requests for information and provided false and misleading information in response to others. The committee report argued that such conduct “showed contempt for the legislative branch and impeded Congress’s exercise of its Constitutional responsibility” of impeachment.

Behavior Incompatible with the Function and Purpose of the Office

A number of individuals have also been impeached for behavior incompatible with the nature of the office they hold. For example, Judge Harry Claiborne was impeached for providing false information on federal income tax forms, an offense for which he had previously been convicted for in a criminal case. The first two articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne simply laid out the underlying behavior. The third article “rest[ed] entirely on the conviction itself” and stood for the principle that “by conviction alone he is guilty of ‘high crimes’ in office.” The fourth alleged that Judge Claiborne’s actions brought the “judiciary into disrepute, thereby undermining public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the administration of justice” which amounted to a “misdemeanor.” The Senate voted to convict Judge Claiborne on the first, second, and fourth articles.

Two judges were impeached for appearing on the bench in a state of intoxication. Judge John Pickering was impeached and convicted in 1803 for, among other things, appearing in court “in a state of intoxication and using profane language.” Judge Mark H. Delahay was impeached in 1873 for his “personal habits,” including being intoxicated on and off the bench. He resigned before a trial in the Senate.

Various other activities incompatible with the nature of an office have merited impeachment procedures. In 1862, Judge West H. Humphrey was impeached and convicted for neglecting his duties as a judge and joining the Confederacy. In 1926 Judge George English was impeached for showing judicial favoritism which eroded the public’s confidence in the court. And in 2009, Judge Samuel B. Kent was impeached for allegedly sexually assaulting two court employees, obstructing the judicial investigation of this behavior, and making false and misleading statements to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the activity. Judge Kent resigned before the Senate trial was completed.

Finally, one might classify some of the articles of impeachment brought against President Clinton as grounded on alleged behavior considered incompatible with the nature of the office of the Presidency. Both the first article, for allegedly lying to a grand jury, and the second, for allegedly obstructing justice by concealing evidence in a federal civil rights action brought against him, noted that by doing this, “William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.”

Misuse of Office for Improper Purpose or for Personal Gain

A number of individuals have been impeached for official conduct for an improper purpose. The first type of behavior involves vindictive use of the office. For example, in 1826, Judge James Peck was impeached for charging a lawyer with contempt, imprisoning him, and ordering his disbarment for criticizing one of the judge’s decisions. Judge Peck was acquitted by the Senate. In 1904, Judge Charles Swayne was also impeached by the House and acquitted by the Senate. Among the articles of impeachment was the allegation that he had unlawfully imprisoned several individuals on false charges of contempt.

The second type of behavior involves misuse of the office for personal gain. Secretary of War William W. Belknap was impeached in 1876 for allegedly receiving payments in return for appointing an individual to maintain a trading post in Indian Territory. Belknap resigned two hours before the House impeached him, but the Senate nevertheless conducted a trial in which Belknap was acquitted. In 1912, Judge Robert W. Archbald was impeached and convicted for using the office to acquire business favors from both litigants in his court and potential litigants. And the impeachments of Judges English, Louderback, and Ritter all involved “misusing their power to appoint and set the fees of bankruptcy receivers for personal profit.”

Similarly, Judge Alcee L. Hastings was impeached by the House on 16 articles, including involvement in a conspiracy to accept bribes in return for lenient sentences for defendants, lying about the underlying events at his criminal trial, and fabricating false documents and submitting them as evidence at his criminal trial. Judge Hastings was convicted by the Senate on eight articles.

In addition, Judge Walter L. Nixon Jr. was convicted in a criminal case on two counts of perjury to a grand jury concerning his relationship with a man whose son was being prosecuted. He was subsequently impeached in 1989 for his behavior, including making false statements to the grand jury about whether he had discussed a criminal case with the prosecutor and attempted to influence the case, as well as for concealing such matters from federal investigators. The Senate convicted Judge Nixon on two of three articles.

Finally, in 2010, Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. was impeached for participating in a corrupt financial relationship with attorneys in a case before him, and engaging in a corrupt relationship with bail bondsmen whereby he received things of value in return for helping bondsman develop corrupt relationships with state court judges. Judge Porteous was convicted by the Senate on all the articles brought against him.

Impeachment for Behavior Prior to Assuming Office

Most impeachments have concerned behavior occurring while an individual is in a federal office. However, some have addressed, at least in part, conduct before individuals assumed their positions. For example, in 1912, a resolution impeaching Judge Robert W. Archbald and setting forth 13 articles of impeachment was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee and agreed to by the House. The Senate convicted Judge Archbald in January the following year. At the time that Judge Archbald was impeached by the House and tried by the Senate in the 62nd Congress, he was U.S. Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit and a designated judge of the U.S. Commerce Court. The articles of impeachment brought against him alleged misconduct in those positions as well as in his previous position as U.S. District Court Judge of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Judge Archbald was convicted on four articles alleging misconduct in his thencurrent positions as a circuit judge and Commerce Court judge, and on a fifth article that alleged misuse of his office both in his then current positions and in his previous position as U.S. District Judge.

While Judge Archbald was impeached and convicted in part for behavior occurring before he assumed his then-current position, the underlying behavior occurred while he held a prior federal office. Judge G. Thomas Porteous, in contrast, is the first individual to be impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate based in part upon conduct occurring before he began his tenure in federal office. Articles I and II each alleged misconduct beginning while he was a state court judge as well as misconduct while he was a federal judge. Article IV alleged that Judge Porteous made false statements to the Senate and FBI in connection with his nomination and confirmation to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. On December 8, 2010, he was convicted on all four articles, removed from office, and disqualified from holding future federal offices.

On the other hand, it does not appear that any President, Vice President, or other civil officer of the United States has been impeached by the House solely on the basis of conduct occurring before he began his tenure in the office held at the time of the impeachment investigation, although the House has, on occasion, investigated such allegations.

Impeachment After an Individual Leaves Office

It appears that federal officials who have resigned have nonetheless been thought to be susceptible to impeachment and a ban on holding future office. Secretary of War William W. Belknap resigned two hours before the House impeached him, but the Senate nevertheless conducted a trial in which Belknap was acquitted. However, during the trial, upon objection by Belknap’s counsel that the Senate lacked jurisdiction because Belknap was now a private citizen, the Senate voted in favor of jurisdiction.

That said, the resignation of an official under investigation for impeachment often ends impeachment proceedings. For example, no impeachment vote was taken following President Richard Nixon’s resignation after the House Judiciary Committee decided to report articles of impeachment to the House. And proceedings were ended following the resignation of Judges English, Delahay, and Kent.

OVERVIEW OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURES

The Constitution sets forth the general principles which control the procedural aspects of impeachment, vesting the power to impeach in the House of Representatives, while imbuing the Senate with the power to try impeachments. Both the Senate and the House have designed procedures to implement these general principles in dealing with a wide range of impeachment issues. This section provides a brief overview of the impeachment process, reflecting the roles of both the House and the Senate during the course of an impeachment inquiry and trial.

The House of Representatives: Sole Impeachment Power

Initiation

Impeachment proceedings may be commenced in the House of Representatives by a Member declaring a charge of impeachment on his or her own initiative, by a Member presenting a memorial listing charges under oath, or by a Member depositing a resolution in the hopper, which is then referred to the appropriate committee. The impeachment process may be triggered by non-Members, such as when the Judicial Conference of the United States suggests that the House may wish to consider impeachment of a federal judge, where an independent counsel advises the House of any substantial and credible information which he or she believes might constitute grounds for impeachment, by message from the President, by a charge from a state or territorial legislature or grand jury, or by petition.

Resolutions regarding impeachment may be of two types. A resolution impeaching a particular individual, who is within the category of impeachable officers under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, is usually referred directly to the House Committee on the Judiciary. A resolution to authorize an investigation as to whether grounds exist for the House to exercise its impeachment power is referred to the House Committee on Rules. Generally, such a resolution is then referred to the House Judiciary Committee. During the House impeachment investigation of President Richard M. Nixon, a resolution reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, H.Res. 803, was called up for immediate consideration as a privileged matter. The resolution authorized the House Judiciary Committee to investigate fully whether sufficient grounds existed for the House to impeach President Nixon, specified powers which the Committee could exercise in conducting this investigation, and addressed funding for that purpose. The resolution was agreed to by the House.

While the House Judiciary Committee usually conducts impeachment investigations, such matters have occasionally been referred to other committees, such as the House Committee on Reconstruction in the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, or to a special or select committee. In addition, an impeachment investigation may be referred by the House Judiciary Committee to one of its subcommittees or to a specially created subcommittee.

Investigation

In all prior impeachment proceedings, the House has examined the charges prior to entertaining any vote. Usually an initial investigation is conducted by the Judiciary Committee, to which investigating and reporting duties are delegated by resolution after charges have been presented. However, it is possible that this investigation could be carried out by a select or special committee. If authorized by the House, the Judiciary Committee may designate a subcommittee or task force to investigate whether an individual should be impeached. For example, in 2009, the House passed a resolution authorizing the Judiciary Committee or a designated subcommittee or task force to investigate whether Judge Porteous should be impeached. The resolution also authorized the taking of depositions, the issuance of subpoenas, the disbursement of funds, and the hiring of staff.

The focus of the impeachment inquiry is to determine whether the person involved has engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. If a subcommittee or task force is charged with investigating a possible impeachment, the Members can vote to recommend articles of impeachment to the full committee. If the full committee, by majority vote, determines that grounds for impeachment exist, a resolution impeaching the individual in question and setting forth specific allegations of misconduct, in one or more articles of impeachment, will be reported to the full House.

House Action Subsequent to Receipt of Committee Report

At the conclusion of debate, the House may consider the resolution as a whole, or may vote on each article separately. In addition, “as is the usual practice, the committee’s recommendations as reported in the resolution are in no way binding on the House.” The House may vote to impeach even if the House Judiciary Committee does not recommend impeachment. Pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, a vote to impeach by the House requires a simple majority of those present and voting, upon satisfaction of quorum requirements. If the House votes to impeach, managers are then selected to present the matter to the Senate. In recent practice, managers have been appointed by resolution, although historically they occasionally have been elected or appointed by the Speaker of the House pursuant to a resolution conferring such authority upon him.

Notification by the House and Senate Response

The House will also adopt a resolution in order to notify the Senate of its action. The Senate, after receiving such notification, will then adopt an order informing the House that it is ready to receive the managers. Subsequently, the appointed managers will appear before the bar of the Senate to impeach the individual involved and exhibit the articles against him or her. After this procedure, the managers would return and make a verbal report to the House.

THE SENATE: SOLE POWER TO TRY IMPEACHMENTS

Trial Preparation in the Senate

Impeachment proceedings in the Senate are governed now by the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials. After presentation of the articles and organization of the Senate to consider the impeachment, the Senate will issue a writ of summons to the respondent, informing him or her of the date on which appearance and answer should be made. On the date established by the Senate, the respondent may appear in person or by counsel. The respondent may also choose not to appear. In the latter event, the proceedings progress as though a “not guilty” plea were entered. The respondent may demur, arguing that he or she is not a civil official subject to impeachment, or that the charges listed do not constitute sufficient grounds for impeachment. The respondent may also choose to answer the articles brought against him or her. The House has traditionally filed a replication to the respondent’s answer, and the pleadings may continue with a rejoinder, surrejoinder, and similiter.

Trial Procedure in the Senate

When pleadings have concluded, the Senate will set a date for trial. Upon establishing this date, the Senate will order the House managers or their counsel to supply the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate with information regarding witnesses who are to be subpoenaed, and will further indicate that additional witnesses may be subpoenaed by application to the Presiding Officer. Under Article I, Section 3, clause 6 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice presides over the Senate impeachment trial if the President is being tried.

In impeachment trials, the full Senate may receive evidence and take testimony, or may order the Presiding Officer to appoint a committee of Senators to serve this purpose. If the latter option is employed, the committee will present a certified transcript of the proceedings to the full Senate. The Senate will determine questions of competency, relevancy, and materiality. The Senate may also take further testimony in an open Senate, or may order that the entire trial be before the full Senate.

At the beginning of the trial, House managers and counsel for the respondent present opening arguments outlining the charges to be established and controverted. The managers for the House present the first argument. During the course of the trial evidence is presented, and witnesses may be examined and cross-examined.

The Senate has not adopted standard rules of evidence to be used during an impeachment trial. The Presiding Officer possesses authority to rule on all evidentiary questions. However, the Presiding Officer may choose to put any such issue to a vote before the Senate. Furthermore, any Senator may request that a formal vote be taken on a particular question. Final arguments in the trial will be presented by each side, with the managers for the House of Representatives opening and closing.

Judgment of the Senate

When the presentation of evidence and argument by the managers and counsel for the respondent has concluded, the Senate as a whole meets in closed session to deliberate. Voting on whether to convict on the articles of impeachment commences upon return to open session, with yeas and nays being tallied as to each article separately. A conviction on an article of impeachment requires a two-thirds vote of those Senators present. If the respondent is convicted on one or more of the articles against him or her, the Presiding Officer will pronounce the judgment of conviction and removal. No formal vote is required for removal, as it is a necessary effect of the conviction. The Senate has not always voted on every article of impeachment before it; for example, when the Senate did not convict President Andrew Johnson in the votes on three of the articles of impeachment against him, the Senate did not vote on the remaining articles.

The Senate may subsequently vote on whether the impeached official shall be disqualified from again holding an office of public trust under the United States. If this option is pursued, a simple majority vote is required.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Impeachment proceedings have been challenged in federal court on a number of occasions. Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court has ruled that a challenge to the Senate’s use of a trial committee to take evidence posed a nonjusticiable political question. In Nixon v. United States, Judge Walter L. Nixon had been convicted in a criminal trial on two counts of making false statements before a grand jury and was sent to prison. He refused, however, to resign and continued to receive his salary as a judge while in prison. The House of Representatives adopted articles of impeachment against the judge and presented the Senate with the articles. The Senate invoked Impeachment Rule XI, a Senate procedural rule which permits a committee to take evidence and testimony. After the committee completed its proceedings, it presented the full Senate with a transcript and report. Both sides then presented briefs to the full Senate and delivered arguments, and the Senate then voted to convict and remove him from office. The judge thereafter brought a suit arguing that the use of a committee to take evidence violated the Constitution’s provision that the Senate “try” all impeachments.

The Supreme Court noted that the Constitution grants “the sole Power” to try impeachments “in the Senate and nowhere else”; and the word “try” “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions.” This constitutional grant of sole authority, the Court reasoned, meant that the “Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted.” In addition, because impeachment functions as the “only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature,” the Court noted the important separation of powers concerns that would be implicated if the “final reviewing authority with respect to impeachments [was placed] in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to regulate.” Further, the Court explained that certain prudential considerations—“the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief”—weighed against adjudication of the case. Judicial review of impeachments could create considerable political uncertainty, if, for example, an impeached President sued for judicial review.

The Court was careful to distinguish the situation from Powell v. McCormack, a case also involving congressional procedure where the Court declined to apply the political question doctrine. That case involved a challenge brought by a Member-elect of the House of Representatives, who had been excluded from his seat pursuant to a House Resolution. The precise issue in Powell was whether the judiciary could review a congressional decision that the plaintiff was “unqualified” to take his seat. That determination had turned, the Court explained, “on whether the Constitution committed authority to the House to judge its Members’ qualifications, and if so, the extent of that commitment.” The Court noted that while Article I, Section 5, does provide that Congress shall determine the qualifications of its Members, Article I, Section 2, delineates the three requirements for House membership—Representatives must be at least 25 years of age, have been U.S. citizens for at least seven years, and inhabit the states they represent. Therefore, the Powell Court concluded, the House’s claim that it possessed unreviewable authority to determine the qualifications of its Members “was defeated by this separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership.” In other words, finding that the House had unreviewable authority to decide its Members’ qualifications would violate another provision of the Constitution. The Court therefore concluded in Powell that whether the three requirements in the Constitution were satisfied was textually committed to the House, “but the decision as to what these qualifications consisted of was not.” Applying the logic of Powell to the case at hand, the Nixon Court noted that here, in contrast, leaving the interpretation of the word “try” with the Senate did not violate any “separate provision” of the Constitution.

In addition, several other aspects of the impeachment process have been challenged. Judge G. Thomas Porteous brought a suit seeking to bar counsel for the Impeachment Task Force of the House Judiciary Committee from using sworn testimony the judge had provided pursuant to a grant of immunity. The impeachment proceedings were initiated after a judicial investigation of Judge Porteous for alleged corruption on the bench. During that investigation, Judge Porteous testified under oath to the Special Investigatory Committee under an order granting him immunity from that information being used against him in a criminal case. Before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Porteous argued that the use of his immunized testimony during an impeachment proceeding violated his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to serve as a witness against himself. The court rejected his challenge, reasoning that because the use of such testimony for an impeachment proceeding fell within the legislative sphere, the Speech or Debate Clause prevented the court from ordering the committee staff members to refrain from using the testimony.

Similarly, Judge Alcee L. Hastings sought to prevent the House Judiciary Committee from obtaining the records of a grand jury inquiry during the Committee’s impeachment investigation. Prior to the impeachment proceedings, although ultimately acquitted, Judge Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for a conspiracy to commit bribery. Judge Hastings’ argument was grounded in the separation of powers: he claimed that permitting disclosure of grand jury records for an impeachment investigation risked improperly allowing the executive and judicial branches to participate in the impeachment process—a tool reserved for the legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected this “absolutist” concept of the separation of powers and held that “a merely generalized assertion of secrecy in grand jury materials must yield to a demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending impeachment investigation.” The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia initially threw out Judge Hastings’ Senate impeachment conviction, because the Senate had tried his impeachment before a committee rather than the full Senate. The decision was vacated on appeal and remanded for reconsideration in light of Nixon v. United States.  The district court then dismissed the suit because it presented a nonjusticiable political question.

*To read the full report with references and notes click here.

No More Fear: It’s Time To Reform Policing In Baltimore

On the evening of April 31, 2012, someone broke into Ashley Overbey’s home in Northeast Baltimore. When Overbey returned from work and noticed her home was awry, she called the police. The responding officers were rude, according to Overbey. They told her, “You live in Baltimore; what do you expect?” She called to file a complaint, and a few more officers arrived—some were helpful, some were not.

Then, as Overbey has recounted, events took an alarming turn. One officer shoved her against a wall and began to hit her. When additional officers arrived, one of them shocked her with a Taser.

Overbey was charged with assault and resisting arrest. The charges were later dropped. She sued the city and won a $63,000 settlement. But her ordeal was far from over. More than a year later, when Overbey defended herself online against accusations that she had instigated the arrest, she received notice from the city of Baltimore that she had violated a “nondisparagement clause” in her settlement agreement. The city withheld half of her settlement.

Ashley Overbey later told an audience that she fears the uniformed officers of the Baltimore Police Department “more than she fears any criminal or thug on the street.” Her experience is representative of too many people in Baltimore—particularly people of color and residents of low-income neighborhoods—who feel that police officers are disrespectful, overly aggressive and often able to act with impunity.

Amid the Baltimore uprising following the death of Freddie Gray, Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake promised greater accountability and transparency for the Baltimore Police Department. But those changes have been slow to come. And just last week, a video surfaced of a police sergeant spitting on a handcuffed subject.

In that spirit, a diverse coalition of faith leaders, grassroots activists and community organizations in Baltimore—the Campaign for Justice, Safety and Jobs—recently released a police-reform agenda consisting of six crucial reforms. The reforms are straightforward: Fire police officers who have demonstrated corruption or unnecessary violence; remove the “gag order” on victims of police misconduct that silenced Ashley Overbey; speed up the distribution of body cameras; promote community policing; publish all police department policies online; and improve de-escalation training. Each of these reforms can and should be adopted immediately—without any changes to state law—by the mayor, police commissioner and City Council.

These are not pie-in-the-sky ideas. They are reasonable demands based on other cities’ experiences, meant to make the BPD more accountable, more transparent and ultimately more effective at working with the community to prevent and solve serious crimes.

They are also achievable. In 2001 the Cincinnati Police Department came under intense scrutiny after officers killed Timothy Thomas, a 19-year-old black man. In response to community demands, the department shifted to a community-policing model, encouraged officers to interact more with community members, started tracking officers who received an abnormal number of complaints and took steps to improve transparency.

Over the next 15 years, Cincinnati saw a 69 percent drop in police use-of-force incidents, a 42 percent drop in citizen complaints and a 56 percent drop in injuries experienced by citizens during encounters with police. Importantly, violent crime dropped from a high of 4,137 incidents in the year after Timothy Thomas’ death to 2,352 incidents in 2014.

The eyes of the nation are on Baltimore. As so many cities across the country deal with the consequences of aggressive policing and the demands of activists like the #BlackLivesMatter movement, Baltimore has a chance to be a model for reform. The city’s elected and appointed officials need to listen to the long-standing demands of the community and make sure that the Baltimore Police Department is serving its true purpose: to maximize safety, decrease victimization and ensure that justice is served.